My dissertation deals with the quest for truth in the poetry of Ted Hughes, as made manifest through tropes such as metaphor, paradox and anthropomorphism. For Hughes, poetry seems to represent a truth-revealing process with the potential of enabling the human being to establish contact with the world-as-it-really-is. Not as an empirically comprehensible entity, but as a presence that seems at once terrifyingly familiar and alien to human comprehension. In short, I will argue that the poetry represents an approach to truth governed by the multitude of traditions and meanings incorporated in the concept of logos. Interestingly, the poetry seems to acquire its driving force through the impenetrability of metaphor and the non-reconciliatory force of paradox. With Hughes, the paradox generally lies in the poetry's refusal to unite in singular, coherent meanings. It remains obscure to the extent that truth can only be found in the opposing, multifarious meanings of the words and phrases. Similarly, the Hughesian metaphor appears to be tautegorical in the sense that it is not constructed on the basis of similarity. This statement is inspired by Schelling's claim that myth refers only to itself as truth as well as Hans Blumenberg's definition of the 'absolute metaphor' as an expression that cannot be reversed into a logical sphere of thought and reasoning. For Blumenberg, philosophical and scientific language is built upon a number of absolute metaphors that express truth. These metaphors do not refer to some thing else and are consequently not transferable into any other type of discourse. The indeterminacy and lack of allegorical reference dominating this kind of metaphorical expression seem to result from it being an expression only of itself as truth. Truth, in this context, has nothing to do with Platonic 'agreement', but has everything to do with letting something be seen, or, to quote Heidegger: 'The 'Being-true' of logos as aletheia means that in legein as discourse the entities of which one is talking must be taken out of their 
to Marcel Detienne, in his book The Creation of Mythology, muthos was a synonym for logos in various contexts throughout the sixth century and even in the first half of the fifth century (Detienne 1986 Muthodes now designated the marvellous, that which was suited to oral expression and the poetic genres {Rep 522a8; Tim 26e5), while alethinos logos characterised truthful, verifiable discourse. The concept of muthos thus came to be regarded as non-rational fiction, wheteas logos was placed in a category of rigorous analysis and the strict ordering of conceptual material. This mode of rigid classification was more or less concomitant with the transition from oral to written discourse, whereby logos came to mean demonstrative truth. Even so, Platonic philosophy makes room for muthos through the compound mythology. One might assume this compound to subordinate muthos effectively within the rational hegemony of logos. Some scholars, indeed, regard it as an effacement of muthos, that is, a refusal to retain it as an independent, sanctified practice. Although muthos still has a mediating function, it is only seen to benefit the state within the paradigm of the logical reasoning that had come to dominate Greek consciousness. Figurative language was superfluous within philosophy and furthermore belonged primarily to rhetoric, the art of persuasion, which Plato viewed with great suspicion. As argued by Nickolas Pappas, the primary function of myth within Platonic philosophy is merely to remind the reader that there is a higher tribunal of justice than the poetic imagination (Pappas 1995: 216) . This view is also adopted by Luc Brisson who, in his book Plato the Myth Maker, contends that when Plato employs the word muthos he both describes it as a particular kind of discourse and criticizes it from the perspective of philosophical discourse {logos) (Brisson 1998: 7). At the same time, however, myth, although morphologically synthesised with logos, in fact assumes an ambiguous role within the philosophical universe. Rather than an inherent part of the dialogue, myth frequently emerges as an autonomous element. In Phaedo, for instance, a myth justifying belief in the immortality of the soul concludes the logical demonstration, whilst the Republic ends with the myth of Er, depicting a process of reincarnation which dramatises the rewards of justice and philosophy. In these instances, the structural formation of the dialogue establishes myth as an appendix beyond the reach of the rational dialectic.
In his article 'The Theatre of Myth in Plato', Jean-Francois Mattei reads this ambiguity as an affirmation that there are elements that cannot be sufficiently explained through the speech of logos: 'Logos is capable of elaborating a theory of knowledge at the conclusion of dialectical conversations only after muthos has oriented the philosopher with a knowledge of theory (Mattei 1988: 68 assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue (Plato 1956: 165-166 The true phusis, that is, a continuous emerging and appearing, is pushed aside for the benefit of the static idea, which becomes the singular, proper meaning of Being. What Heidegger seems to suggest, on the other hand, is a dualistic perception of logos, arising from the aforementioned contention that logos is both that within and through which presence takes place. Heidegger points out that early Greek philosophy held logos to be at one with, or, at least, belonging together with phusis in and as Being. This aspect of logos seems to transcend the human being in the sense that it is described as 'apprehension', which, as Heidegger stresses, is not a constitutive essence of man. Phusis, as Being, is 'that for the sake of which apprehension happens' (Heidegger 2000: 184) . In spite of this fundamental beyondness, however, the human being will always seek truth as Being and attempt to render Being manifest through, or in, the essent. This act renders logos a constitutive essence of man. Occurring in and through man as the gathering and apprehending of the being of essents, logos becomes a feature of the constitutive essence of the human being and, in this sense, ceases to be an element of Being itself.
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In its former state, then, logos is a possibility and necessity within Being itself, whilst in the second aspect it has been made manifest in and through the human being. As logos becomes manifest through and in the essent, the human being leaps into language. This is a fundamental movement, in the sense that language is that which gives form to the essent and opens it up in its being. For Heidegger, language is logos in the sense that it is a collecting and a gathering together, and, thus, it also functions to disclose logos. Accordingly, the human being becomes a gatherer through language, with the task to fulfil and preserve the disclosure of 
Opening up to the limit-the importance of "muthos as logos
In parallel, offering the conclusion that myth is the form of logos that reveals itself as Being, or kosmos, to the human consciousness. Thus, myth is also kosmos within logos, because as it has a mediating position between the two, which are really one, it can be seen to constitute the structure both of logos though this establishes a being in common rather than a 'common being'. Furthermore, muthos as laying out belongs to a metaphysical reality consigned to the one, that is, logos, that appears to elude the binaries of logocentrism and enter upon the field that Plato terms 'the third genus' {Tim 48a, 52a), that is, the logic of the ambiguous khora. In his article 'Khora', Derrida states that the khora only names immanence -it appeats to be 'neither this nor that, at times both this and that', alternating between a logic of exclusion and participation which 'stems perhaps only from a provisional appearance and from the constraints of rhetoric, even from some incapacity for naming' (Derrida 1995 
Conclusion
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